

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BELGRA 02520 01 OF 02 221441Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-06

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03

NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00

EB-08 FEAE-00 FPC-01 INT-05 OMB-01 STR-04 TRSE-00

NRC-05 /158 W

-----221729Z 068357 /44

R 220930Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 373

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 2520

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PARM ENRG TECH YO

SUBJ: KRIVOKAPIC ON DISARMAMENT AND US NUCLEAR ENERGY  
POLICY

1. SUMMARY: DURING LENGTHY DISCUSSION FSFA SENIOR DISARM-  
AMENT OFFICIALS REVIEWED FIRST STAGE OF SSOD AND PRESIDENT  
CARTER'S NEW NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY. (HIS DISCUSSION OF  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BELGRA 02520 01 OF 02 221441Z

KRSKO WILL BE REPORTED SEPTTEL -- NOTAL). YUGOSLAVS WERE  
PLEASED WITH SMOOTHLY-RUN SSOD PREPCON BUT EXPECT SOME  
DIFFICULTIES IN THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE STAGES -- DIFFICULTIES  
RELATED TO MOSCOW'S INSISTENCE ON A LINK WITH A WORLD  
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (WDC), THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN  
THE SALT TALKS AND THE LACK OF ENTHUSIASM SHOWN BY  
NATIONS LIKE THE PRC AND FRANCE. WHILE THE YUGOSLAV

REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR ENERGY IS NOT COMPLETE, GOY APPARENTLY FEELS STRONGLY THAT ACCEPTANCE OF US PLAN WOULD MAKE THE COSTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY MORE EXPENSIVE TO SMALL COUNTRIES LIKE YUGOSLAVIA. IN SUMMARIZING HIS IMPRESSION OF WORLD REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT HE SAID THERE SEEMS TO BE MARKEDLY LESS THAN COMPLETE APPROVAL. HE NOTED THAT THE FRG HAD ISSUED ITS EXPORT LICENSE FOR NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT TO BRAZIL A DAY OR SO AFTER PRESIDENT SPOKE. END SUMMARY.

2. UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) -- FSFA DISARMAMENT EXPERT STEVAN KRIVOKAPIC TOLD ACTG POLCOUNS AND EMBOFF THAT GOY WAS PLEASED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH SSOD PREP CON WAS CONDUCTED AND THAT MOST OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WERE DISPATCHED EASILY. GOY SEES SLIGHTLY ROUGHER TIME AHEAD WHEN SUBSTANCE IS DISCUSSED. DESPITE OPPOSITION FROM THE WEST AND MANY OF THE NONALIGNED, THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THEIR FRIENDS CONTINUE TO VIEW SSOD AS LITTLE MORE THAN A PREPARATORY STAGE FOR A WDC, AND ARE URGING INCLUSION OF SOME FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE TWO.

3. THE NEXT ROUND WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY A LARGER NUMBER OF INTENSIFIED DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITHIN SSOD FRAMEWORK, AS WELL AS IN THE CCD AND THROUGH BILATERALS. WHIEL ACKNOWLEDGING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF DISARMAMENT-RELATED DISCUSSIONS ARE UNDERWAY IN OTHER FORUMS, KRIVOKAPIC AGAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BELGRA 02520 01 OF 02 221441Z

NOTED THAT A SUCCESSFUL SSOD SHOULD ENCAPSULATE ALL OF THE OTHERS AND WILL PERHAPS DEFINE THE MEANS AND METHODOLOGY OF DISARMAMENT. BY DOING SO IT WILL GET INVOLVED WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF SPECIFIC MATTERS. (IN THIS REGARD HE CITED AS EXAMPLES MBFR AND NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES.)

4. IN ADDITION TO SOVIET DESIRE FOR LINKAGE WITH WDC, OTHER PROBLEMS TO BE FACED WILL BE THE EXTENT OF DISARMAMENT PROGRAM TO BE CONSIDERED, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE "BIG POWERS" WILL GO ON TALKING BILATERALLY WITHOUT TAKING THE INTERESTS OF OTHER NATIONS INTO ACCOUNT, AND THE EXISTING NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF BOTH THE PRC AND FRANCE. THE PRC, WITH WHOM HE SAID THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE HAD SOME TALKS ON THE SSOD, HAS SHOWN A GOOD DEAL OF RESERVE AND SKEPTICISM BOTH ABOUT SSOD AND DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENERAL, WHICH THE CHINESE PERCEIVE AS WESTERN AND SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE THEIR DOMINATION BY DISARMAING SMALLER COUNTRIES COMPLETELY.

THE FRENCH MAINTAIN THAT THE SIZE OF THEIR NUCLEAR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BELGRA 02520 02 OF 02 221614Z

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-06

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03

NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00

EB-08 FEAE-00 FPC-01 INT-05 OMB-01 STR-04 TRSE-00

NRC-05 /158 W

-----221710Z 071373 /44

R 220930Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 374

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 2520

FORCE RENDERS IT OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE IN OVERALL DISARMAMENT  
CONTEXT. FRANCE IS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN CONSUL-  
TATIONS BUT DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE DISARMING. THUS,  
SERIOUS PARTICIPATION BY BOTH FRANCE AND THE PRC, SAID  
KRIVOKAPC, IS NOT LIKELY. HE ADDED -- THAT TO  
COMPLICATE THE ISSUE FURTHER THE SOVIETS POINT TO BOTH  
THE FORCES OF FRANCE AND THE PRC AS AUGMENTING THAT OF  
THE US AND THE UK AND THUSLY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BELGRA 02520 02 OF 02 221614Z

CONSIDERATIONS OF DISARMAMENT. NEVERTHELESS, HE STATED, SSOD SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN "ACCELERATOR" OF THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS.

5. KRIVOKAPCI OFFERED THE VIEW THAT LAST WEEK'S "PRAVDA" EDITORIAL RESPONDING TO THE US SALT PROPOSALS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY FOR DOMESTIC SOVIET CONSUMPTION. HE SAID HE IS NOT PESSIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES, HE MENTIONED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WEC, ARE ALWAYS VERY INITIATIVE-MINDED BUT ONE FINDS QUITE ANOTHER ATTITUDE WHEN PRACTICAL MEASURES ARE RAISED.

6. US NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY STATEMENT -- HE SAID THE STATEMENT IS STILL BEING EXAMINED BY YUGOSLAV NUCLEAR PHYSICS EXPERTS. ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS HE SAID THAT HE MIGHT ASK HOW MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE WOULD NUCLEAR ENERGY BECOME UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER'S PLAN. HE SAID THAT WHILE THIS MAY NOT BE A MAJOR CONSIDERATION FOR THE US IT WOULD AFFECT SMALLER COUNTRIES LIKE YUGOSLAVIA SINCE THE PROGRAM WOULD APPEAR APPRECIABLY TO INCREASE THE EXPENSE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. IT MAY, FOR INSTANCE, MAKE NUCLEAR ENERGY UNECONOMICAL AS COMPARED WITH THE USE OF COAL. YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS MUST HAVE THE CHEAPEST ENERGY, HE STRESSED.

7. HE SAID HE AND OTHERS WONDERED WHETHER THERE IS YET TO BE ISSUED A SECOND PART OF THE US PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ADDRESS THE ENERGY NEEDS OF THE REST OF THE WORLD AND SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE NEED FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

8. WHILE THE QUESTION OF PROLIFERATION IS A REAL ONE, HE SAID, IT IS AN INCREASINGLY GREAT ILLUSION THAT ANY SMALL COUNTRY WITH "BOMBS, 10, 20, EVEN 30 OF THE SIZE THAT DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA", WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BELGRA 02520 02 OF 02 221614Z

THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF A SUPER POWER. THE KEY TO USAGE WOULD BE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND, THEREFORE, HE SAID HE WAS SKEPTICAL THAT SUCH SMALL COUNTRIES WOULD REPRESENT A THREAT TO MORE THAN THEIR NEIGHBORS.

9. HE SUGGESTED A BETTER PROGRAM WAS ONE ALONG THE LINES MENTIONED BY FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR REGIONAL CENTERS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES UNDER STRONG INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. HE SAID POSSIBILITIES FOR THESE ARE ALREADY BEING INVESTIGATED AT THE EXPERT LEVEL

WITHIN THE IAEA.

10. WHILE UNABLE TO CLEAR UP KRIVOKAPIC'S CONCERN ON THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE NEW US ENERGY POLICY, EMBOFFS DECLARED THAT US STOOD TO LOSE A GOOD DEAL COMMERCIALY THROUGH INTRODUCTION OF NEW POLICY. THEY ADDED THAT US IS CONCERNED ABOUT ENERGY COSTS TO US AND OTHER NATIONS AND IS SYMPATHETIC TO NEEDS OF OTHER NATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN DEVELOPING WORLD ON USE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. REGARDING PROLIFERATION (PARA 8 ABOVE), EMBOFFS SAID THAT POSSESSION OF EVEN ONE SMALL BOMB IN IRRESPONSIBLE HANDS REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT THREAT AND THAT THE TARGET OF SUCH A THREAT -- WHETHER A MAJOR POWER OR A SMALL NATION -- WAS UNIMPORTANT COMPARED TO THE POTENTIAL MAGNITUDE OF MASS DESTRUCTION WHICH COULD BE FACED.

11. AT CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSION KRIVOKAPIC SAID HE LOOKED TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US BOTH HERE AND AT THE UN DURING THE NEXT SSOD STAGES.

12. COMMENT: NONE OF THAT WHICH KRIVOKAPIC OFFERED ON THE SSOD WAS NEW. NEVERTHELESS WE CONTINUED TO URGE THE USDEL AT SSOD TO KEEP CLOSE TO HIM AND YUGOSLAVS (AS WE WILL HERE) TO INDICATE OUR SYMPATHETIC INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT AND PERHAPS PREVENT ANY SURPRISES FROM  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BELGRA 02520 02 OF 02 221614Z

TAKING PLACE. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WITH NONALIGNED BACKING SSOD WILL PRODUCE A HOST OF RESOLUTIONS. BY CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH THE YUGOSLAVS WE MAY BE ABLE TO FUNNEL SOME OF THESE INTO CONSTRUCTIVE AVENUES.

13. KRIVOKAPIC'S COMMENTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT MUST BE READ IN LIGHT OF CURRENT IMPASSE OVER KRSKO AND PRESENT YUGOSLAV POLICY ORIENTATION WHICH ARGUES THAT THENUCLEAR POWERS ARE INHIBITING THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY (FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, THEY MAINTAIN) BY SMALL NATIONS, IMPOSING MONOPOLISTIC CONDITIONS ON THE LESS ADVANCED, AND THUS INHIBITING ECONOMIC GROWTH. YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR ENERGY, PERSONAL OPINION, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 22-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977BELGRA02520  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770140-0761  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** BELGRADE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770431/aaaabaag.tel  
**Line Count:** 269  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 263430a1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2730439  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** KRIVOKAPIC ON DISARMAMENT AND US NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PARM, ENRG, TECH, YO, US, (KRIVOKAPIC, STEVAN)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/263430a1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009